Unmanned aircraft systems must demonstrate a capability to sense and avoid air traffic as part of a layered conflict management system to enable safe operations in the National Airspace System. During operations, an unmanned aircraft system should attempt to remain "well clear" to minimize the need for a collision avoidance action. Previously, a well-clear definition was adopted for large unmanned aircraft systems; however, this definition is not appropriate for small unmanned aircraft system weighing less than 55 lb operating at low altitudes. In response, this paper outlines research toward a definition of well clear for small unmanned aircraft systems, based on airborne collision risk, for midterm concepts of operations at low altitudes in nonterminal airspace.
I. Introduction T HE U.S National Airspace System (NAS) is a dynamic and complex system that supports a safe and efficient air traffic system. Both its capacity and ability to maintain safety are stressed by numerous air carriers, cargo airlines, business jets, general aviation, and, most recently, unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). Regulatory organizations such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization mandate the use of systems, such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), on large commercial manned aircraft to minimize the risk of midair collisions. However, TCAS has not been certified as an acceptable means of compliance with for UAS detect and avoid (DAA) requirements. A supporting argument for this lack of certification is that manned aircraft performance assumptions are not applicable to UASs.
New DAA algorithms and systems designed specifically for UASs are being developed and standardized so that UASs are not a collision hazard within the NAS. These DAA capabilities need to include a functional well-clear requirement for beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) operations where the unmanned aircraft is not within line of sight (LOS) of the operator. The term "well clear" is codified semantically but not mathematically in the Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 "General Operating and Flight Rules" in paragraphs 91.113 "right of way rules" and 91.181 "Course to be flown". A DAA capability will enable UASs to remain well clear from and avoid collisions with manned aircraft.
In June 2013, the UAS Executive Committee (EXCOM) Science and Research Panel (SARP) was charged with making a recommendation for a quantitative definition for well clear to support large UASs, such as Global Hawk. The SARP was originally established in 2011 by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics for Unmanned Warfare and then aligned under the UAS EXCOM Senior Steering Group in 2013. Member organizations include government laboratories, federally funded research and development centers, and sponsored university research centers. It aims to identify UAS research gaps, ensures that sound technical approaches are being employed to overcome these challenges, and seeks to eliminate duplication of effort. In 2014, the SARP provided a well-clear recommendation, refined by the FAA, for large UAS to Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee 228 (SC-228), which has since published a standard for the design and use DAA systems and their associated radar sensors.
Although a mathematical definition of well clear was identified as a need for large UASs in 2004 [1] , a need for well clear for small unmanned aircraft systems (sUASs), which have a maximum gross takeoff weight (MGTOW) of 55 lb, was identified around 2014. This need was driven by a drastic expansion of the sUAS market, which has only been established within the past half-decade. This market expansion was driven by widely affordable sUASs for consumers and small businesses to civil and government organizations, while leveraging the previously underused low-altitude airspace. sUASs required a specific well-clear definition because they have widely different dynamics and operations than larger UASs and encounter a different distribution of manned aircraft at these lower altitudes. In response, the SARP began research on providing a well-clear recommendation for sUAS operations in April 2015. This was timely; UAS sales grew 224% year-over-year from April 2015 to April 2016 ‡ and were largely driven by sUASs. This paper outlines research toward a well-clear recommendation tailored to sUAS versus manned aircraft for midterm BVLOS concepts of operations at low altitudes below 1200 ft AGL in nonterminal airspace. LOS operations governed by the FAA sUAS regulations rule (Part 107) were out of scope. Unlike for large UASs, there was less previous research and contributions to leverage for sUASs. As a result, many of the key contributions focused on modeling low-altitude sUAS operations. In addition to the sUAS well-clear recommendation, key contributions include the development of a statistical model of lowaltitude manned helicopter operations, a characterization of aircraft performance across the sUAS market, development of a sUAS trajectory model applicable across sUAS use cases, and a sensitivity analysis of how different variables influence airborne collision risk.
II. Method
We adopted an unmitigated collision risk-based method [2] , similar to the previous successful SARP effort to recommend well clear for large UASs [3] . Results were also informed by operational acceptability. We define well clear as a relative separation where a desired unmitigated risk threshold is achieved. The unmitigated condition asserts that all aircraft in the encounter are unaware of each other, and the collision risk is independent of any separation maneuver. We assume that maintaining well clear implies that a collision avoidance action is likely not needed.
We evaluated candidate well-clear definitions based on simulated Monte Carlo encounters between a sUAS and a manned aircraft. We assumed that neither aircraft was equipped with collision risk mitigation such as transponders or TCAS. We solely evaluated well clear in simulation; costly flight tests were not conducted. Our Monte Carlo method is ideal to identify encounter situations or classes of situations that are difficult to resolve without a DAA system. These encounter situations, although realistic, may be extremely rare and likely would not have been discovered through curated encounters or flight tests alone. Specifically, this simulation approach, vetted by the SARP, consists of the following.
1) Define potential well-clear forms and risk threshold.
2) Define manned and unmanned encounter models.
3) Tune candidate definitions via Monte Carlo simulations. 4) Evaluate operational suitability and assess sensitivity to assumptions.
5) Forum with subject matter experts (SMEs) to downselect wellclear candidates.
6) Make well-clear recommendation.
The majority of the technical development focused on developing capabilities to appropriately model the low-altitude nonterminal airspaces where sUASs operate. This was partly due to a lack of a historical emphasis on low-altitude operations. We faced three main challenges unique to low-altitude sUAS operations: 1) limited datasets of manned aircraft operating below 1200 ft, 2) a corpus of observed sUAS operations or representative trajectories does not exist, and 3) sUAS dynamics are fundamentally different from manned aircraft or large UAS.
Addressing these challenges was important because they directly influenced the simulated aircraft flight profiles and dynamics. In response, new manned aircraft models were developed and used in conjunction with existing models; sUAS performance was based upon an analysis of the sUAS market; and sUAS trajectories were based upon likely commercial applications that BVLOS operations will enable. However, similar to previous efforts, we did not model weather, terrain, obstacles, or air traffic control (ATC) involvement. Additionally, because of the variety of low-altitude considerations, a single Monte Carlo simulation developed from sampling encounter models was not sufficient. We assessed sensitivity of collision of risk to the assumptions and models.
A. Well-Clear Forms and Risk Threshold
We defined collision risk as the probability of a near midair collision (NMAC).
§ NMAC is a common safety metric used to evaluate DAA systems because it naturally relates to relevant safety criteria. Candidate well-clear definitions were primarily evaluated based upon the unmitigated relationship of a well-clear violation and NMAC:
When assessing airborne risk, we envisioned that, if well clear is not violated, the immediate risk of an NMAC is low. Well-clear candidates were also considered if they were operationally suitable. Although a very large and conservative well-clear definition may have a low risk of NMAC upon violation, it may not be operationally suitable.
With risk as the primary evaluation metric, we considered many different mathematical forms of well clear. Formally, well clear could be defined as any combination of spatial components [4] : horizontal separation r, vertical separation Δh, or temporal components [5, 6] τ, τ mod , and distance modification (DMOD). DMOD is spatial threshold used to control the behavior of τ mod to account for specific types of encounters, such as slow closure encounters, and τ mod is a temporal variable defined as the modified time till closest point of approach (CPA):
Well clear, defined with these components, is mathematically symmetric, where both the UAS and manned aircraft have the same perception of the UAS being in well clear or not [6] . We did not assume or give preference to any specific well-clear form. Instead, the unmitigated risk was calculated for all identified potential forms. This was manageable because we only considered the two spatial and three temporal variables. Additionally, because TCAS does not issue avoidance maneuvers at low altitudes, we did not need to consider any TCAS interactions.
B. Risk Assessment Architecture
We leveraged the Collision Avoidance System Safety Assessment Tool (CASSATT) [7] to simulate aircraft as a six-degree-of-freedom point mass. CASSATT has previously supported support numerous studies, including the large UAS well-clear effort [3] . The inputs to CASSATT include the initial positions, orientations, and nominal maneuvers generated by an encounter model. The output of a single simulated encounter was the time history of the aircraft states and relative geometry during the encounter.
The modeled encounters between the sUAS and a manned aircraft were uncorrelated [8, 9] in the sense that there was intervention by ATC to maintain separation, and no transponder information was exchanged. The uncorrelated assumption contends that both the sUAS and manned aircraft did not use Mode A beacon code of 1200 operating visual flight rules (VFRs) and that either the sUAS or manned aircraft may not be equipped with a transponder. Manned aircraft were represented via statistical encounter models (Sec. III), whereas sUAS used a use-casebased model (Sec. IV). Encounters were uniformly sampled to have an initial horizontal separation of 4000-10,000 ft, and initial vertical separation was uniformly sampled from 0 to 500 ft. An encounter ended if horizontal separation between aircraft exceeds 10,000 ft or if an aircraft's altitude drops below 0 ft AGL. An encounter ends if any aircraft reaches an altitude of 0 ft or less. We enhanced CASSATT to ensure that no aircraft started the encounter below 0 ft, and sufficient amount of simulated time passed before either aircraft "landed". However, we did not consider ground approach paths; it was possible that the manned aircraft could descend much faster at low altitudes than what is deemed safe for real-world operations. Additionally, we implemented dynamics similar to fixed-wing aircraft when in forward stable flight and could not execute extreme lateral accelerations (e.g., nearly 90 deg turns). Thus, the dynamics of popular quadrotor sUAS and medical transport helicopters are not completely represented. However, previous simulations assumed (and validated in Sec. III) that helicopters generally operate similar to general aviation aircraft [10] , regardless of a helicopter's unique dynamics.
Finally, we historically generated encounters enforced a condition where both aircraft are initialized in the same altitude range, as dictated by the discretization of the encounter models. If this constraint was implemented, manned intruder aircraft would always be initialized between [500, 1200) ft because that is the lowest altitude bin in the uncorrelated encounter model. Because of the quick vertical transit times and desire for encounter variety, manned aircraft were able to initialize up to 1700 or 500 ft above the 1200 ft ceiling of the sUAS. Thus, from an encounter model perspective, manned aircraft could be sampled either from the [500, 1200) ft or [1200, 3000) ft altitude bins. This was a first for CASSATT simulations.
C. Sensitivity Analysis: Evaluation, Downselect, and Recommendation
We assess the sensitivity of results based on various criteria. sUASs had four different dynamics and five potential trajectories; the manned aircraft were either a general fixed-wing or helicopter air ambulance (HAA); and a candidate definition can be a combination of temporal or spatial variables. Sections III and IV describe the unmanned and manned models in detail. Because of the slower aircraft airspeeds and lower operational altitudes, the sUAS § A NMAC is defined as a simultaneous loss of 500 ft horizontal and 100 ft vertical separation.
well-clear candidates had a practical upper bound based upon the large UAS well-clear definition of a horizontal and vertical separation of 4000 and 450 ft.
III. Manned Aircraft Encounter Models
We leveraged the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory (LL) encounter models to simulate manned aircraft. These models are probabilistic Bayesian networks modeled using Markovian dynamics. MIT LL has used these encounter models for several operational assessments, including safety assessments of aircraft avoidance systems for manned and unmanned aircraft [7, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] or standards development or trade studies [2, 3, 18] . Non-MIT LL efforts include estimating collision detection and risk and estimation of aircraft dynamics [19] [20] [21] [22] .
A. Manned Modeling Needs
Historically, analyses of fixed-wing aircraft at altitudes below 1200 ft were treated as niche cases. Low-altitude airspace is generally used by fixed-wing manned aircraft to transit to or from higher altitude and airspeeds; the majority of operations occur above 1200 ft. Although reasonable for previous efforts to emphasize higher altitudes, this altitude assumption does not apply to most sUAS operations. Although the MIT LL encounter models were trained with low-altitude manned trajectories, this only represents a small portion of the training data.
Similarly, aircraft avoidance for rotary-wing aircraft [23] has been another niche case, reflected by the previously developed MIT LL models not distinguishing between fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft.
With an overwhelmingly majority of sUASs operations expected to occur at low altitudes and likely encounter helicopters [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] , the traditional fixed-wing-based encounter models were no longer sufficient.
In response, two manned encounter models were used: the uncorrelated fixed-wing encounter model was used primarily to quantify general aviation VFR behavior, and a newly developed helicopter air ambulance encounter model. Models were sampled uniformly across airspace class and geographic region.
B. Manned Model Development
Both models are structured as a Bayesian network, a representation of a multivariate probability distribution as a directed acyclic graph [31] . Each node in the network structure represents a variable, and arrows represent conditional dependencies between variables. There are two Bayesian networks in an encounter model: an initial network to set up an encounter, and a transition network to describe how the variables specifying the trajectories evolve over time. The dynamic Bayesian network structure is learned by maximizing the posterior probability of the network structure given the data. Dynamic behavior is modeled in a dynamic Bayesian network as a Markov decision process. Aircraft turn rate, airspeed acceleration, and vertical rate may change once per second.
To develop the uncorrelated fixed-wing encounter model, radar data were used from the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. MIT LL processed radar data from more than 200 FAA and Department of Defense sites throughout the contiguous United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Caribbean. A detailed explanation of processing the radar data into the encounter model can be found in the documentation of other models [9, 32] .
To develop the uncorrelated HAA encounter model, flight operational quality assurance (FOQA) data from a Massachusettsbased HAA operator were used. This model is unique in that it is the first to focus on helicopter operations and the first to be built using high-quality FOQA. In comparison, most of the other encounter models focus on fixed-wing flight and are built using radar data. Because FOQA data only report information on a single HAA in flight, and a nondisclosure agreement limited the ability to correlate HAA tracks with other air surveillance sources. Unlike the fixedwing model, a density model and encounter rate estimation were not generated.
The HAA encounter model is representative of much loweraltitude operations than the uncorrelated fixed-wing manned encounter model. Approximately 50% of HAA observations used to build the model occurred at low altitudes. The uncorrelated manned encounter model skews to higher altitudes than the HAA, approximately 13% observations used to build the uncorrelated fixed-wing model were initially observed between 500 and 1200 ft AGL. Just 10% of these low-altitude observation were in either class E or G airspace, constituting over 100,000,000 radar observations.
IV. Unmanned Aircraft Encounter Model
Developing the sUAS models was the most challenging aspect of this research effort. During this research, BVLOS sUAS operations were still rare and experimental in nature. There was not a potential data source of BVLOS operations to leverage. Instead of using observed behavior, the sUAS model was based upon a characterization of the sUAS market and identified sUAS capabilities. The model was informed by different data sources: association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) air platform database ¶ ; FAA certificate of authorizations (COA) and Section 333 exemptions; and interviews and outreach with active or potential sUAS end users.
Foremost, AUVSI maintains an air platform database documenting over 2400 platforms across 900 companies. In 2016, we examined about 1000 active platforms that met the sUAS criteria of a MGTOWof 55 lb or less. We noted that the advertised performance is often better than reality; the implication was a slightly conservative the well-clear recommendation, as airborne risk generally increases with airspeed. Next, a COA was issued by the FAA to a public operator for a specific UAS operation at a specific time and location. A Section 333 Exemption issued by the FAA enabled commercial UAS operators to obtain a COA that was required to operate in the NAS. Before Part 107, Section 333 exemptions enabled commercial operators to originally operate under a nearly nationwide blanket COA for visual LOS operations originally below 200 ft AGL and later raised to 400 ft AGL. In March 2015, we analyzed over 1200 sUAS across 926 Section 333 exemptions.
These analyses were complimentary. The AUVSI database provided insight into what potential sUASs were available, whereas the FAA records characterized specific deployed sUASs. For example, Fig. 1 illustrates that approximately 50% of advertised sUASs in the AUVSI database had a MGTOWof 10 lb or less. At least 35% of FAA commercial exemptions report using a sUAS with a MGTOW of 4.4 lb or less.
The developed sUAS model focused on potential commercial or civil sUAS BVLOS operations. Malicious or hobbyist operations were not considered. Note that a hobbyist UAS encounter model, built from a corpus of approximately of 75,000 sUAS missions, was generated in support of development of collision avoidance algorithms designed for multirotor aircraft [33] . Further detail on the hobbyist encounter model was detailed in a Ph.D. dissertation [34] .
A. Small Unmanned Aircraft System Dynamics
In general, an aircraft has many different defined airspeeds; these are known as V-speeds. In addition to assuming that the sUAS is always flying greater than the stall speed, the speed where the aircraft begins to lose lift and control, two V-speeds were leveraged when defining the representative sUASs: cruise V C , the speed at which the aircraft is designed for optimum performance, and the maximum operating speed V MO . Because of the lack of available information, we did not distinguish between maximum airspeed and the neverexceed speed. We also assumed that most sUAS operators will leverage the vendor recommended performance guidelines.
The modeled sUAS did not change airspeed during the simulation and behaved like a fixed-wing aircraft without the ability to maneuver laterally at extreme angles. sUAS control was indicative of stable flight under nominal conditions and not automatic lost link procedures. The lack of available sUAS flight data necessitated these ¶ Data available online at http://roboticsdatabase.auvsi.org [retrieved 25 January 2017].
assumptions. To better account for realistic conditions, such as airspeed variability and preference to operate at the cruise airspeed, the sUAS airspeeds were sampled from a Gaussian distributions with a heuristically defined standard deviation. We resampled if the airspeed was less than 0 kt but did not account for potential stall airspeeds:
We selected specific simulated airspeeds based on a characterization of the relationship between MGTOWand cruise or maximum airspeed, as illustrated by Fig. 2 . Fixed-wing aircraft generally advertised faster maximum airspeeds. About a third of sUAS advertised a maximum airspeed greater than 60 kt. Regardless of MGTOW, cruise speeds generally are advertised to be under 60 kt, with the maximum speed advertised less than 30 kt. At these slow airspeeds, the sUAS cannot travel very far during an encounter. Note that cruise speed is less often reported than the maximum speed. Figure 3 further organizes the relationship between cruise and maximum airspeed to highlight their linear relationship. There were limited reports that contained MGTOW, cruise speed, and maximum airspeed. Whereas maximum airspeed was provided for 302 fixedwing sUASs, only 175 fixed-wing sUASs had both cruise and maximum airspeed. The reduction of rotary-wing data was even more pronounced; only 38 rotary-wing sUAS listed both airspeeds, or just about 20% that listed a maximum airspeed. However, similar to what Fig. 2 shows, cruise speed is rarely advertised to be greater than 60 kt, regardless of MGTOW. Figure 3 illustrates that maximum airspeed can be advertised as double that of cruise.
Notionally, 60 kt was important because it is slower than the cruise speed of most manned aircraft. The original Piper J-3 Cub, an iconic low-speed fixed-wing manned aircraft, has a maximum airspeed of 70 kt, ** and its variants are assumed to have cruise and maximum airspeeds between 60 and 80 kt. The uncorrelated manned encounter model's initial airspeed distribution was estimated as Gaussian distributed with a mean of approximately 100 kt [9] . This implied that, in a sUAS and manned aircraft, the manned aircraft will exert significantly more influence on the relative aircraft rates. Consider an encounter where both aircraft share the same heading and the sUAS is ahead of the manned aircraft. The sUAS cannot "outrun" the manned aircraft, making overtaking encounters very likely.
We necessitated that at least three representative sUASs be defined, as exemplified by the distinct clustering in Fig. 3 . A fourth representative sUASs was developed to quantify very high-performance platforms, such as the ScanEagle. Compared to manned or large UAS aircraft, the modeled sUAS operated very differently. The sUASs are much slower (e.g., the Piper J-3 Cub is expected to always fly faster than three of the representative sUASs). However, the sUAS vertical performance can be comparable to manned aircraft at these low altitudes. We note that these dynamics are not representative of specific sUAS and emphasize that they were developed to assist in assessing well clear for a range of sUAS dynamics. We did not assert whether they are representative of a fixedor rotary-wing sUAS. Table 1 reports the performance characteristics of the representative sUASs.
B. Small Unmanned Aircraft System Use-Case-Based Trajectories
With dynamics established, we generated trajectories informed by SARP identified 13 potential use cases for sUAS BVLOS operations. Fundamental flight dynamics have little variation between different use cases because many are remote sensing operations. Although the surveillance targets will vary, optimization of flight plans can be agnostic to the use case. We assumed that a sUAS will typically fly one or more of the five distinct types of trajectories over a single operation. One of the trajectories represents a horizontal transit where the sUAS is airborne at the start of the encounter and maintains a straight line level flight profile until the encounter ends. Another trajectory was hovering where the sUAS will climb near the start of the encounter, maintain some altitude, and then descend again; the sUAS has no horizontal motion and was never initialized above the manned aircraft. The remaining three pattern-based trajectories were a uniform distribution of creeping line, sector, and spiral patterns, which are routinely used for airborne surveillance. We did not encounter sets for each type of pattern trajectory to avoid oversampling of and biasing the results toward the surveillance patterns. Generated sUAS trajectories were sampled uniformly over altitudes of 50-1200 ft AGL. The size of the area influenced how often and how many turns a trajectory would have. The shorter the width or height was, the faster the traverse was and the sooner a turn was required. We sampled across 10 different areas of varying size A use case may consist of multiple trajectories. For example, the crop monitoring use case may require a horizontal transit to the field of interest and then a pattern trajectory to surveil the crops. With SME feedback, SARP asserted whether the trajectories mostly meets, somewhat meets, or rarely meets objectives of the use cases. Table 2 shows that at least one of the trajectories mostly meets each use case objectives; many use cases are mostly met by multiple types of trajectories.
V. Simulation Results
Over 6 million encounters were simulated to derive the unmitigated NMAC risk. For each combination of representative sUAS and trajectory, we simulated 125,000 encounters each. Across combinations for each of the four representative sUAS, approximately 180,000 encounters experienced a horizontal separation of 4000 ft or less and a vertical separation of 450 ft or less. Except in rare cases, CPA occurred within the first few minutes of an encounter. Thousands of NMACs were observed for each sUAS.
Because the true likelihood of encounters was unknown, encounters were weighted uniformly. Partly due to the uniform weighting, the unmitigated risk contours quickly converged within approximately 75,000 encounters. For different candidate definitions, the results converge quickly, similar across representative well-clear candidates. Using a bootstrapping resampling method, the risk estimates are assumed to be accurate within 1%.
A. Lack of Temporal Sensitivity
We found that incorporating a temporal criterion as part of well clear had limited effect on PNMACjWell-ClearViolation. This was attributed to the sUAS's slow airspeed relative to the manned aircraft. To illustrate this relative difference, Fig. 4 is the range of closing speeds produced by any combination of airspeeds [17] . Assuming a worst-case encounter without acceleration, the range rate is the sum of the airspeeds. The more horizontal contour trends indicate that sUAS has little effect on closing speed.
The relative airspeed differences were exhibited by risk results. Table 3 provides some select estimated risk values for candidate definitions using a spatial definition of horizontal and vertical separation and a definition that adds temporal components of τ mod and DMOD. There was a lack of significant risk sensitivity between the spatial only, and temporal included well-clear candidates. A lack of sensitivity was observed across various DMOD and τ mod criteria. The differences in risk estimates were within the margin of error.
This negligible sensitivity is attributed to the sUAS's limited ability to influence range rate, due to slow relative sUAS airspeeds, and subsequently τ mod . As more operationally feasible definitions are considered, the difference in risk between definitions shrinks. Additionally, the inclusion of the temporal components did not significantly improve the risk values. From an operational standpoint, a spatial-only definition would also be much easier to implement than one with temporal criteria. A key result of this lack of sensitivity is the Fig. 3 Cruise and maximum airspeed organized by MGTOW. Number of data points is in parentheses. 
B. Lack of Aircraft Sensitivity
The risk contours were not sensitive to a sUAS's performance, sUAS's trajectory, or manned aircraft encounter model. For reference, approximately 35% of uncorrelated fixed-wing manned aircraft were initialized with manned airspeeds of 90-120 kt, regardless of attitude. The lack of sensitivity to the sUAS is primarily attributed to their relatively slow airspeeds; a sUAS simply cannot travel far during an encounter. Even for small areas, a sUAS conducting a surveillance pattern would not be expected to turn often during an encounter. For large areas, the pattern trajectories become very similar to a horizontal transit; the sUAS may only turn once. For hover or vertical transits, the sUAS has no unmitigated horizontal ability to reduce risk. If a head-on encounter transpired, the sUAS was nearly a fixed object from the manned aircraft's perspective.
The lack of sensitivity to manned aircraft behavior is attributed to their normal low-altitude operations. Manned aircraft are unlikely to have small vertical changes below 1200 ft. Instead, they were more likely to have sustained vertical rate and representative of transitioning through class G airspace. In general, coaltitude encounters are more dangerous but more so for sUAS due to their limited ability to strongly influence the encounter geometry. Figure 5 illustrates the aggregate risk contours of PNMACjWellClear Violation, given horizontal miss distance (HMD) and vertical miss distance (VMD). As horizontal separation decreases, the risk contour becomes more vertically oriented, and vertical separation has less of an influence on NMAC risk. Increasing the vertical separation criteria of a well-clear candidate has diminishing returns. This was attributed to the fact that, at a small horizontal separation, the aircraft are already significantly close enough to easily transition to an NMAC relatively short.
C. Unmitigated Risk Contours

VI.
Well-Clear "Hockey Puck" Recommendation Table 4 reports the sUAS well-clear candidates considered by the SARP for safety and operational suitability. The recommendation is a simple hockey puck definition of simultaneously lost horizontal separation of 2000 ft and vertical separation of 250 ft. There is no temporal or tau-based component to the recommendation. The following section provides justification for this hockey puck recommendation: discussion on why the large UAS definition was not applicable for sUAS; the relationship between wingspans and midair collision (MAC) probabilities; and how the sUAS recommendation provides sufficient time for a collision avoidance maneuver.
A. Previous Work for Large Unmanned Aircraft System
The large UAS well-clear definition was based the unmitigated NMAC risk specific to the dynamics of large UAS operating in class E and G airspace. It was tuned to PNMACjWell-Clear Violation 1.5% and informed by user acceptability [3] . In developing the recommendation, the SARP evaluated three illustrative definitions across eight acceptability metrics using four different risk architectures. The SARP analyses included Monte Carlo assessments from MIT LL, stressing case assessments from the U.S. Air Force, controller acceptability by NASA Langley Research Center, and "a day in the NAS" by NASA Ames Research Center.
The Monte Carlo analysis did not account for sensor uncertainty, controls latency, or atypical limits on aircraft dynamics, nor was any analysis performed assuming instrument flight rules operations. The analysis consisted of unstructured uncorrelated encounters without unique terminal dynamics, such as traffic patterns or ATC spacing. ATC acceptability away from terminal areas only was examined. It did not account for terminal operations disruptions, such as alerting on marginal situations causing an aircraft to break out of a traffic pattern. Additionally, the HAA encounter model did not exist yet and was not available for the large UAS analysis.
In 2014, the recommended large UAS well-clear definition was refined by the refined by the FAA and then provided to RTCA SC-228 for standardization. It was initially limited to UAS en-route operations through class D and E airspaces up to FL180 and class G airspace to or from class A or special use airspaces. Before standardization, an end-to-end verification and validation simulation study of the RTCA SC-228 standard was published [35] . After review, the large UAS well-clear definition was composed of spatial and temporal components:
DMOD 4000 ftjDMOD ≡ r
Δh 450 ft (9) This recommendation was informed by the relative higher-altitude operating environment of the larger UASs, which led to a significant weighting of acceptability metrics related to TCAS and ATC. The SARP originally considered a PNMACjWell-Clear Violation 5% but needed to reduce to 1.5% primarily due to an operationally unacceptable unmitigated probability of a TCAS resolution advisory. However, TCAS will only issue traffic advisories and no maneuverbased resolution advisories below 1000 ft, rendering this TCAS sensitivity criteria not applicable for low-altitude sUASs. Furthermore, UAS very low level (VLL) operations that are exclusively below 500 ft AGL in any applicable airspace class are currently out of the scope for The large UAS well-clear definition has recently been leveraged as part of sUAS automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) study [36] , independent of the SARP. Duffield analyzed sUAS operating in high-density ADS-B airspace and the limitations of 978 MHz ADS-B with respect to well clear. This ADS-B-based study did not leverage the higher-fidelity manned and unmanned encounter models nor considered unmitigated risk or operational feasible to implement a tau-based well clear. Although this study did not influence the hockey puck unmitigated risk-based well-clear recommendation, the methodology can be applied in future work to evaluate the well-clear recommendation in a high-density airspace.
B. Collision Risk and Wing Spans
Well clear was be evaluated as a risk mitigation for MACs, not NMACs. The simulations leveraged NMAC because of its historical usage; introducing a new metric relative to a MAC would add unnecessary complexity and potential confusion. Although the NMAC volume was not changed, the assumption regarding the potential transition from an NMAC to an MAC can be tailored for the unique sensibilities of sUASs.
Many aviation safety studies assume that the probability of experiencing a MAC if an NMAC occurs is 10%. However, research has shown that PMACjNMAC 0.1 is an overly conservative estimate. As the sum of wingspans shrinks, so does the MAC risk, as illustrated by Fig. 6 . We assume a low rate of 1% for sUAS, an order of magnitude lower than the historically used but (previously) not validated assumption [12] .
The physically small size of sUASs provided a risk mitigation for a smaller PMACjNMAC. Figure 7 is the distribution of sUAS length or wingspans from the AUVSI database. All wingspans were less than 16 ft with majority less than 8 ft. In comparison, small manned aircraft such as a Piper J-3 Cub or Cessna 150 have wingspans of 32-36 ft. This implies that the majority of sUASs have wingspans that are at least a quarter of a manned wingspan.
Furthermore, Fig. 8 illustrates a distribution of 382 manned wingspans.
‡ ‡ Similar to the AUVSI database, this gave insight into what manned aircraft are available, rather than use of a specific aircraft. For manned aircraft weighing less than 30,000 lb, all reported a wingspan less than 100 ft, and 50% had a wingspan of 80 ft or less. Manned aircraft modeled by the MIT LL uncorrelated encounter model tend to be smaller and are reasonably assumed to weigh 30,000 lb or less. For example, a Cessna 150 weighs a few thousand pounds; a Beechcraft King Air, a twin-turboprop, has a MGTOW of approximately 10,000 lb; and a Dassault Falcon, an executive jet, has a MGTOW of approximately 29,000 lb.
It was reasonable for the large UAS and sUAS well-clear boundaries to share the same probability of a MAC given a well-clear violation PMAC j Well-Clear Violation. The large UAS-based research estimated this at 1.5% assuming PMACjNMAC 10%, which is a reasonably conservative estimate, given that some large UAS have wingspans greater than 100 ft. Referring back to Fig. 6 , PMACjNMAC could be as low as 1% because it was very likely for the sum of wingspans between a sUAS and general aviation aircraft to be less than 50 ft and unlikely to exceed 100 ft. Thus, a smaller estimate of 1% was used for PMACjNMAC, given the smaller wingspans of sUASs. sUAS well-clear definitions with PNMACjWell-Clear Violation up to 10% are considered feasible.
C. Persevering the Collision Avoidance Timeline
After violating well clear, the sUAS may transition into a collision avoidance encounter, as defined by time to CPA. From the beginnings of the air traffic management system in the 1950s [37] to TCAS development in the 1970s and 1980s [38] , and the current development of the TCAS replacement [39] , collision avoidance has been defined as a 30-60 s time window before an airborne collision. It was also assumed that ATC separation has failed, and ATC will provide no additional assistance. The aircraft pilots must resolve the encounter themselves. We also made no assumptions regarding transponder equipage when considering collision avoidance.
For operational suitability, it was important to not change the concept and time window of collision avoidance. This is due to the amount of time required to increase separation to avoid an NMAC [37] and can be demonstrated with simple calculations. For example, consider the relative vertical rate between aircraft executing vertical maneuvers to avoid an NMAC:
t800 ft∕ min 7.50 s (12) t300 ft∕ min 20 s
Even at slow vertical rate changes, 100 ft of vertical separation can be achieved in tens of seconds. Yet a collision avoidance maneuver should not just narrowly prevent an NMAC. Upon violation of the well-clear boundary, there should be sufficient time to execute a maneuver and avoid excessive concern for proximate manned aircraft. This consideration is not unique for sUAS and was addressed for the large UAS as well [4] . The recommended well-clear vertical separation of 250 ft enables sufficient time to resolve a collision avoidance geometry with even a modest relative vertical rate ( _ h). A low-performance sUAS has the capability to vertically resolve an encounter without a coaltitude manned aircraft maneuvering: The recommended sUAS well-clear definition is designed to support a sUAS maintaining separation from manned aircraft to avoid an NMAC. The sUAS is operating BVLOS and outside the current jurisdiction of the FAA Part 107 rule, which is limited to LOS operations. The recommendation applies to all sUAS less than 55 lb and does not distinguish between fixed-, rotary-, and hybrid-wing platforms. No assumption is made regarding transponder equipage, such as ADS-B, because the recommendation is based upon unmitigated risk. The recommendation is further bound by airspace class and an airspeed limit, as discussed later.
Airspace Class and Operations
Although there was a lack of unmitigated risk sensitivity to airspace class and geographic region, the NAS consists of more than just uncorrelated encounters; ATC provides a significant safety service but is not involved in uncorrelated encounters. Furthermore, unstructured uncorrelated encounters are extremely rare in terminal airspaces.
Similar to the large UAS well-clear analysis, it was assumed that no ATC services were provided to the sUAS, and the analysis was uncorrelated in scope. In response, the hockey puck sUAS well-clear recommendation is currently limited to class E and G airspaces for sUAS altitudes up to 1200 ft. It is also not recommended for airport operations, regardless of airspace class.
Airspeed Limit
The sUAS well-clear recommendation is guided by the relative dynamics between a sUAS and manned aircraft; manned aircraft are typically running over the slower sUASs. An airspeed limit for the hockey puck well-clear definition is recommended to account for this underlying dynamic. This airspeed limit should be more reflective of cruise, rather than maximum, airspeed and should not put undue burden on majority sUASs.
Aircraft, manned and unmanned, typically do not operate at their maximum airspeed. This is due to a variety of reasons from operational constraints to impacts on range and endurance. sUAS examples of this behavior include a DJI Phantom II, which has an advertised maximum airspeed of 29 kt, operating at 4 kt [40] ; a Tempest N1 cruising at 35 kt [41] , which has an advertised maximum Fig. 7 Advertised distribution of sUAS length and wingspan (in feet) reported in AUVSI air platform database. In parentheses is the number of platforms used to generate the distribution. airspeed of 95 kt § § ; or a Silver Fox operating at 50 kt [42] , below the 60 kt maximum airspeed. These three examples highlight the wide range of the airspeed difference.
As illustrated by Fig. 3 , 95% of advertised sUAS cruise airspeeds are less than 60 kt, which is slower than the overwhelming majority of manned aircraft. As demonstrated by the airspeed distributions within the uncorrelated encounter model, manned aircraft usually operate faster, with the Piper J-3 Cub variants at 60-80 kt as a representative minimum manned aircraft airspeed. Additionally, there was not a drastic change in airspeed distributions between the 2008 [8] and 2013 [9] uncorrelated encounter models. It is not expected that the distribution of manned aircraft airspeeds at these low altitudes will notably change as sUAS regulations are developed.
In response, a sUAS airspeed limit of 60 kt is advocated to bound the hockey puck well-clear recommendation. The limit is faster than majority of assumed sUAS operational airspeeds while remaining slower than majority of manned aircraft. It preserves the underlying assumption that the manned aircraft will likely be faster than the sUAS and subsequently have the manned aircraft dictate the encounter geometry. Furthermore, a wingspan limit was also briefly considered by the SARP but was deemed to have little utility. We assumed that the majority of sUASs will continue to be notably smaller than manned aircraft, and it very reasonable to assume a sum of wingspans of 100 ft or less.
VII. Conclusions
This study evaluated safety of sUAS well-clear definitions in an analytical manner specific to the dynamics and concept of operations unique to sUAS BVLOS operations. The lack of sUAS data and lowaltitude operations was addressed with extensive data collection and processing. The collision risk was found to not be sensitive to assumptions. This lack of sensitivity is attributed to generally slow sUAS airspaces. Therefore, the SARP is recommending a simple hockey puck definition of simultaneously lost of horizontal separation of 2000 ft and vertical separation of 250 ft. Unlike the large UAS well-clear definition and TCAS alerting criteria, there is no temporal component to the sUAS well-clear recommendation. Last, future work includes community vetting of the operational suitability of the recommendation is expected. Additional analysis is recommended to evaluate niche cases such as consistently fast operations.
